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law, to which the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not ap-
plicable. This contention was sustained, and the case was re-
manded for proceedings consistent with the court's decision. As
the litigation is not terminated, comment on the merits of the
question would be inappropriate. The procedural determination,
however, appears to be correct. 62
Parol Evidence
The stream of recent jurisprudence regarding suits on oral
contracts involving mineral leases was at least negatively in-
volved in Fontenot v. Fontenot 3 Plaintiffs sued to enforce an
alleged oral contract under which defendants, mineral lease
brokers, induced plaintiffs to lease to defendant's principal for
$5.00 an acre by promising that if more was paid to any other
lessor "in the block," defendants would personally pay plaintiffs
the difference. Counsel for defendants urged that under Hayes
v. Muller 64 and other similar cases, parol evidence was inadmis-
sible in proof of the claim. However, the court held that this
suit did not involve a claim of an interest in a mineral lease dis-
puted among parties thereto. The case was analyzed as one in-
volving a disclosed agent who exceeded his authority and thereby
became personally bound. Thus, it was held that parol evidence
was admissible in proof of the claim. However, the triumph on
the legal issue proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for plaintiffs as
the court held that the evidence did not support the alleged oral
agreements. Thus the judgment rendered by the lower court in
favor of defendants was affirmed.
Considering the facts of the case as recited by the court, there
seems little question as to the correctness of the result.
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
In the case of Gunter v. Lord,' the Supreme Court denied
double recovery to a passenger in an insured vehicle, claimed
62. This decision is noted with approval in 40 TUL. L. REV. 934 (1966).
63. 175 So. 2d 910 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
64. 245 La. 356, 158 So. 2d 191 (1963).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 242 La. 943, 140 So. 2d 11 (1962), noted in 23 LA. L. REv. 353.
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under the medical expense provision of the policy and also under
the liability coverage for the injuries sustained. This decision
was distinguished in Sonnier v. State Farm Mutual,2 and it was
held that an insured who had received payment from his insurer
under the medical payments provision of his policy was entitled
to recover also against the insurer of the car operated by the
tortfeasor notwithstanding that the same insurer wrote the
policies on both cars. The holding appears to be in keeping with
the view of the Supreme Court as expressed in the Gunter case
although the expression had reference to different insurers.
Three possible choices are available in this kind of situation:
(1) the injured person can be allowed recovery against his
medical expense insurer and also against the tortfeasor; (2)
subrogation of the medical expense insurer for the payment
made to its insured could be allowed; or (3) the amount re-
coverable against the tortfeasor could be reduced by the amount
received from the medical expense insurer, thus giving the tort-
feasor the benefit of this payment. The court chose the first
alternative. Considering the second alternative, it is interesting
to notice that the family combination automobile policy does
not provide for subrogation covering expenses for medical serv-
ices. On the other hand, certain special policies of the National
and Mutual Bureaus do contain stipulations of this kind, as do
also many policies issued by independent companies. Subroga-
tion has traditionally not been considered applicable to insur-
ance against personal injury any more than to life insurance.
It has been suggested that the theories underlying this rule are,
in the main, that insurance against personal injury cannot be
considered a contract of indemnity; that the insured should be
entitled to the benefit of the premiums he has paid as a reward
for his own thrift; and that tort damages may fall short of
complete indemnification for personal injuries, having especially
in mind the necessity of paying the fees of an attorney.3 Although
the inclusion of medical expense coverage in an automobile lia-
bility policy may be attributable to accident rather than thrift
or foresight on the part of the insured, perhaps the same argu-
ments may have some degree of validity when applied to medical
expense payments. 4 The third alternative involves relieving the
2. 179 So. 2d 467 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
3. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1478 (1966); Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance
Subrogation, 60 MICH. L. REV. 841 (1962).
4. Subrogation is, of course, allowed in favor of a collision insurer paying its
insured to cover a loss occasioned by a tortfeasor. It is not entirely clear that
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tortfeasor of a burden it would be advisable for him to bear and
would also give him the benefit of insurance for which he has not
paid. Of the three possibilities, the better view would seem to
be to permit double recovery by the insured. Having reached
this point, it would be rather difficult to make an exception on
the sheer basis that the insurer of the tortfeasor happened to
be the same as the insurer of the medical expense beneficiary.
Subrogation accompanies payment. In theory, the claim that
is paid and thus extinguished is maintained fictitiously in favor
of the subrogee.5 Where the amount paid to the subrogor is less
than the entire amount due, the subrogee can claim from the
debtor only what he has paid, and a partially paid subrogor may
exercise his right for the balance due in preference to. the sub-
rogee. In Broadview Seafoods, Inc. v. Pierre,6 a collision insurer
paid its insured for damage to the latter's car and was conven-
tionally subrogated. Inasmuch as the car was being driven at
the time of the accident by a third person for whom the insured
was not responsible but who was a joint tortfeasor with the
driver of the other car, the court of appeal concluded that the
collision insurer could not acquire by subrogation a claim
against the other driver and his insurer. This view was taken
on the basis of policy language which made the operator of
insured's vehicle an insured covered by the subrogation provi-
sions. The Supreme Court properly reversed. The payment to
cover the damage to the vehicle was made to the owner of the
vehicle as the insured with respect to the collision loss. Con-
sequently, the right of the owner receiving the payment against
the other driver subsisted fictitiously in favor of the insurer.
The owner was, of course, not a. joint tortfeasor.
such a difference exists between collision coverage and medical expense coverage
that subrogation, allowed in the former case, should be denied in the latter. This
statement is made with conventional subrogation in mind. There are cases both
for and against allowing legal subrogation to an insurer. In 1842 Judge Martin
recognized that legal subrogation may take place not only when one person binds
himself with another or binds himself for another, but also when he is bound
for the same debt as another. Howe v. Frazer, 2 .Rob. 424 (La. 1842). It is true
that the Civil Code denies the benefit of subrogation to a mere volunteer who
pays another's debt although he is "no way concerned in it." LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 2134 (1870). But an insurer paying its insured under the medical expense
provisions of its policy has "an interest in discharging" the debt brought about
by the tortfeasor's wrongful conduct and might for this reason be counted as
within the reach of Civil Code art. 2161.
5. 6 AuBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANIAIS, OBLIGATIONS (AN ENGLISH
TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) § 321 (1965). LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 2160 (1870) provides that the subrogation must be made at the same
time as the payment. Since when a claim is paid it no longer exists, the creditor
cannot thereafter grant the right of subrogation.
6. 248 La. 533, 180 So. 2d 694 (1965).
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Consistent with the foregoing is the fact that where an acci-
dent is caused by the joint negligence of both drivers the amount
paid to one under an uninsured motorist provision cannot be
recovered by his insurer from the other.7
In McConnell v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,8 the argument was
made that, since no permission was given to a repairman to use
the car delivered to him for repairs other than to road test it,
which use fell within an exclusion of the owner's policy, the
repairman could not be counted as an omnibus insured so as to
render the owner's insurer responsible within the rule of Parks
v. Hall9 while the car was being operated at night on a personal
mission. In its original opinion the court rejected this argument,
saying: "This theory, as we view it, changes the rule from initial
permission to initial coverage." At the same time, it found that
implied permission to use the car for social purposes had been
given subsequent to the initial delivery. In a per curiam issued
on rehearing, the court found it unnecessary to dispose of the
mentioned argument because of the permission subsequently
given. As filed, the suit was against the garage insurer as well
as the insurer of the car. The judgment of the court of appeal
denied recovery against both. The writ granted by the Supreme
Court did not disturb the denial of recovery against the garage
insurer, which was based on a finding that the accident did not
occur during a use in connection with the business. It is, how-
ever, not necessarily more logical to find coverage through op-
eration with permission under an owner's policy although the
only permission given is to use the car under circumstances that
would exclude coverage, than to find coverage based on road
testing although the driver had shifted from road testing to a
purely personal use. Consonant with the spirit of Parks v. Hall,
it might be said that, since there is coverage under the garage
liability policy when the car is taken out for road testing, this
coverage cannot be destroyed by a change from testing to per-
sonal use on the part of the repairman any more than initial
permission to use for a given purpose can be converted into use
without permission by a change of purpose on the part of the
user. Under the Parks doctrine, permission establishes coverage
7. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Brown, 181 So. 2d 799 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1965).
8. 248 La. 509, 180 So. 2d 406 (1965).
9. 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938).
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of the permittee which will not terminate by a change from
authorized to unauthorized use. Under the garage liability policy,
use for road testing establishes coverage. There seems to be,
therefore, merit for the view that once coverage attaches, e.g.,
by a grant of permission for a particular use or by use for road
testing, it will not terminate by a change from the authorized
to an unauthorized use. It is also true that the giving of per-
mission by the owner to the repairman to road test the car does
not institute coverage under the owner's policy whereas coverage
under the garage liability policy is instituted by operation for
road testing. In the final analysis, it may be justifiable to ask
which insurer, if either, should bear the risk on such facts.
In the case of Dumas v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 10 while
returning the owner's car to his home after its servicing had
been completed, the service station attendant was involved in
an accident. The owner's liability policy contained a clause de-
signed to exclude coverage "while [the owned automobile] is
used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise
engaged in the automobile business." As defined in the policy,
the automobile business included the servicing of automobiles.
It was held that the exclusionary clause was not applicable be-
cause the servicing had been completed at the time the accident
occurred. In consequence, of course, judgment was rendered
against the owner's insurer. The opinion leaves some questions
unanswered. In the first place, it seems clear that at the time
of the accident the attendant was "employed" in the automobile
business although he was not engaged in servicing the car at the
time. There is also the more serious question of whether the
decision is consonant with the purpose of the exclusion. Pre-
sumably the service station did not carry a garage liability
policy. If it had and the insurer had also been sued, the court
would have had a choice between finding coverage under the
garage liability policy or under the owner's policy. The former
presumably would have turned on whether the accident occurred
during a use in connection with the business. If the act of re-
turning the owner's car to him as agreed was such a use, then
the garage liability policy would have been applicable. As be-
tween the garage or the individual, the cost of protection under
the facts in question ought to be allocated to the garage, both
10. 181 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966). This case is discussed 27 LA. L.
Rav. 113 (1966), where other similar decisions are considered.
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on the ground that the expense should be borne by the business
and the fact that the service station operator rather than the
individual selects the operator and should be responsible for
him.
In a well-reasoned opinion in Peterson v. Armstrong," it
was held that a son who had the use of the family car for a
period of time while away in school had implied authority to
give permission to another to use the car so as to constitute the
latter an omnibus insured despite the father's suggestion that
the "best thing to do" was not to let others drive. The court's
opinion was supported by the fact that the parents were aware
of other instances when the son had permitted others to drive.
The case also took the view that a policy provision for a pro-
portional division of the loss on the basis of policy limits was
applicable only to the primary coverage, not to the excess. In
consequence, two excess insurers were held solidarily liable up to
the applicable limits of their coverage. This view is followed by
the better-reasoned cases from other jurisdictions.
The family combination automobile policy contains provisions
for the payment of medical and funeral services of anyone in-
jured or killed while occupying the owned automobile and of the
named insured and relatives of the named insured while occupy-
ing a non-owned automobile. A generally recognized principle
applicable to such policies is that the insurance on the car is
primary and that on the driver or occupants under another
policy of insurance is excess. Pursuant to the stated principle,
it was held in Rancatore v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.12 that
the liability of the defendant insurer with respect to its named
insured and relatives while occupying a non-owned automobile
was excess over that of the insurer whose policy covered the car
in which they were riding as guests.
An insured is required to do what he reasonably and pru-
dently can to prevent the destruction of or damage to property
covered by a policy of insurance and is entitled to be indemnified
for losses sustained in undertaking to do so. Some policies so
provide. In any event, the principle of indemnification is par-
ticularly applicable when the policy excludes loss or damage
caused by the insured's neglect to use all reasonable means to
11. 176 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
12. 177 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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save and preserve property imperilled by a risk insured against.
Policies containing provisions of both types were involved in
Harper v. Pelican Trucking Co.1 3 In a well-reasoned and care-
fully documented opinion, the cost of salvage operations was held
chargeable against the insurers of a vehicle and its cargo where
there was imminent danger of further loss or damage because of
a collapsed bridge.
Under La. R.S. 22:692, a fire insurer may not rely on a
breach of a warranty, representation, or condition if the breach
existed at the time of the loss and was then "known to the
insurer or to any of its ... agents" except where there is fraud
or collusion between the agent and the insured. In McCoy v.
Pacific Coast Fire Ins. Co.,' 4 this provision was held a bar to
the insured's defense based on the ground that the insured had
begun the operation of a restaurant on the premises whereas
they were described in the policy as "apartments." It was shown
that seventeen months before the loss occurred the agent had
received from the Louisiana Rating and Fire Prevention Bureau
a new rate card covering the premises in question which re-
flected the presence of a restauurant but the agent had not com-
pared the rate card with the policy. The holding avoids the dif-
ficulty of the insured's proving actual knowledge by the insurer
of the breach which might be very great. At the same time,
however, it does operate to protect an insured whose position
may not be so clearly equitable.
The McCoy case was followed in Bailey v. American Marine
& Gen. Ins. Co.,15 and the court expressed the view that notice
of facts which ought to excite inquiry and which if pursued
would lead to knowledge of other facts operates as notice thereof.
In an interesting case of first impression, the court, in Olinde
Hardware & Supply Co. v. Rogers,16 held that the rights of the
debtor under a group life insurance certificate became fixed with
respect to total disability at the time the disability began not-
withstanding that the policy may have been automatically can-
celled during a six-months' waiting period. The opinion gives
to the insured the protection contemplated by the policy.
13. 176 So. 2d 767 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
14. 248 La. 389, 178 So. 2d 761 (1965).
15. 249 La. 98, 185 So. 2d 214 (1966).
16. 185 So. 2d 626 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
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